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Dynamic epistemic logics which model abilities of agents to make various announcements and influ-
ence each other’s knowledge have been studied extensively in recent years. Two notable examples
of such logics are Group Announcement Logic and Coalition Announcement Logic. They allow us
to reason about what groups of agents can achieve through joint announcements in non-competitive
and competitive environments. In this paper, we consider a combination of these logics – Coalition
and Relativised Group Announcement Logic and provide its complete axiomatisation. Moreover, we
partially answer the question of how group and coalition announcement operators interact, and settle
some other open problems.
1 Introduction
To introduce the logics we will be working with in this paper, we start with an example loosely based
on the one from [17]. Let us imagine that Ann, Bob, and Cath are travelling by train from Nottingham
to Liverpool through Manchester. Cath was sound asleep all the way, and she has just woken up. She
does not know whether the train passed Manchester, but Ann and Bob know that it has not. Now, if
the train driver announces that the train is approaching Manchester, then Cath, as well as Ann and Bob,
knows that they have not passed the city yet. To reason about changes in agents’ knowledge after public
announcements, we can use Public Announcement Logic (PAL) [16]. Returning to the example, let us
assume that the train driver does not announce anything, so that Cath is not aware of her whereabouts.
Ann and Bob may tell her whether they passed Manchester. In other words, Ann and Bob have an
announcement that can influence Cath’s knowledge. An extension of PAL, Group Announcement Logic
(GAL) [2], deals with the existence of announcements by groups of agents that can achieve certain
results. Now, let us assume that Ann does not want to disclose to Cath their whereabouts and Bob does,
i.e. Ann and Bob have different goals. Then, it is clear that no matter what Ann says, the coalition of
Bob and Cath can achieve the goal of Cath knowing that the train has not passed Manchester, that is,
Bob can communicate this information to Cath. On the other hand, if Ann and Bob work together, then
they have an announcement (for example, a tautology ‘It either rains in Liverpool or it doesn’t’) such
∗This is a corrected version of [13]. The previous version considered CoGAL, a combination of CAL and GAL without
relativised operators. There is a gap in the completeness proof of CoGAL given in [13]. Specifically, the proof of the Lin-
denbaum Lemma (Proposition 2.19) fails to demonstrate that when adding a witness ψG for ¬ηi([〈G〉]ϕi), we also have all the
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2 Coalition and Group Announcement Logic
that whatever Cath says, she remains unaware of her whereabouts. For this type of strategic behaviour,
another extension of PAL – Coalition Announcement Logic (CAL) – has been introduced in [3].
CAL joins two logical traditions: Dynamic Epistemic Logic, of which PAL is a representative, and
Coalition Logic (CL) [15]. The latter allows us to reason about whether a coalition of agents has a
strategy to achieve some goal, no matter what the agents outside of the coalition do. CL essentially
talks about concurrent games, and the actions that the agents execute are arbitrary actions (strategies in
one-shot games). So, from this perspective, CAL is a coalition logic with available actions restricted to
public announcements.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no complete axiomatisation of CAL [3, 11, 4, 5] or any other
logic with coalition announcement operators. In this paper, we consider Coalition and Relativised Group
Announcement Logic (CoRGAL), a combination of an extension of GAL and CAL, which includes
operators for both group and coalition announcements. The main result of this paper is a sound and
complete axiomatisation of CoRGAL. As part of this result, we study the interplay between group and
coalition announcement operators, and partially settle the question on their interaction that was stated as
an open problem in [11, 5].
2 Coalition and Relativised Group Announcement Logic
2.1 Syntax and Semantics
Throughout the paper, let a finite set of agents A, and a countable set of propositional variables P be
given. The language of the logic is comprised of the language of classical propositional logic with
added operators for agents’ knowledge Kaϕ (reads ‘agent a knows ϕ’), and public announcement [ψ]ϕ
(reads ‘after public announcement that ψ , ϕ holds’), relativised group announcement [G,χ]ϕ (‘given
some announcement χ , whatever agents from G announce at the same time, ϕ holds afterwards’), and
coalition announcements [〈G〉]ϕ (‘for every public announcement by coalition of agents G there is an
announcement by other agents A\G, such that ϕ holds after joint simultaneous announcement’).
Definition 2.1. (Language) The language of coalition and relativised group announcement logicLCoRGAL
is as follows:
ϕ,ψ ::= p | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ψ) | Kaϕ | [ϕ]ψ | [G,ψ]ϕ | [〈G〉]ϕ ,
where p ∈ P, a ∈ A, G⊆ A, and all the usual abbreviations of propositional logic (such as ∨,→,↔) and
conventions for deleting parentheses hold. The dual operators are defined as follows: K̂aϕ ↔ ¬Ka¬ϕ ,
〈ϕ〉ψ ↔¬[ϕ]¬ψ , 〈G,ψ〉ϕ ↔¬[G,ψ]¬ϕ , and 〈[G]〉ϕ ↔¬[〈G〉]¬ϕ . Observe that 〈G,ψ〉ϕ means that G
has an announcement such that after announcing it in conjunction with ψ , ϕ holds, and 〈[G]〉ϕ means that
G has an announcement such that after it is made simultaneously with any announcement by A \G, ϕ
holds. The latter corresponds to the Coalition Logic operator, but for announcements instead of arbitrary
actions.
We define LRGAL as the language without the operator [〈G〉], LPAL the language without [G,ψ] as
well, andLEL the purely epistemic language which in addition does not contain announcement operators
[ϕ].
Next definition is needed for technical reasons in the formulation of infinite rules of inference in
Definition 2.5. We want the rules to work for a class of different types of premises. Ultimately, we
require premises to be expressions of depth n of the type ϕ1→ 1(ϕ2→ . . .(ϕn→ n]) . . .), where i
is either Ka or [ψ] for some a ∈ A and ψ ∈LCoRGAL, atom ] denotes a placement of a formula to which
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a derivation is applied, and some ϕ’s and ’s can be omitted. This condition is captured succinctly by
necessity forms originally introduced by Goldblatt in [14].
Definition 2.2. (Necessity forms) Let ϕ ∈LCoRGAL, then necessity forms [14] are inductively defined as
follows:
η ::= ] | ϕ → η(]) | Kaη(]) | [ϕ]η(]).
The atom ] has a unique occurrence in each necessity form. The result of the replacement of ] with ϕ in
some η(]) is denoted as η(ϕ).
Whereas formulas of coalition logic [15] are interpreted in game structures, formulas of CoRGAL
are interpreted in epistemic models. Let us consider an example of such a model first. In Figure 1 there
b b¬p p
c
a, b, c a, b, c
M M¬p
b¬p
a, b, c
w v w
Figure 1: Train example
are three agents: a (Ann), b (Bob), and c (Cath). Let p denote the proposition that ‘The train has passed
Manchester.’ There are two states in the model M: a state w where ¬p is true, and a state v where p is
true; and only one state in model M¬p which denotes M updated by the announcement ¬p (the process
of updating the model is described below). Let the w be the actual state. Edges connect states that an
agent cannot distinguish. In the actual state w of M, Cath (agent c) does not know whether p is true.
Ann and Bob, on the contrary, know that p is false. Now suppose that Bob announces that ¬p. This
truthful public announcement ‘deletes’ all the states where p is true, and the corresponding epistemic
indistinguishability relations; in this example, v is ‘deleted,’ and the resulting model is M¬p. After
this announcement Cath knows ¬p, or, formally, [¬p]Kc¬p. In this paper, within group and coalition
announcements, we only quantify over announcements of formulas of the type Kaϕ . If a group consists
only of Cath, who does not know ¬p and hence cannot announce Kc¬p, the following holds in state w
of M: [c,>](¬Kc¬p∧¬Kc p), i.e. whatever c announces, she still does not know whether p after the
announcement 1. Also, Ann and Bob can remain silent (or announce a tautology >) and preclude Cath
from knowing that ¬p. In other words, there is announcement by their group such that after it is made,
agent c does not know the value of p: 〈{a,b},>〉(¬Kc¬p∧¬Kc p). Moreover, this holds whatever Cath
announces at the same time: 〈[{a,b}]〉(¬Kc¬p∧¬Kc p). On the other hand, a coalition consisting of Ann
and Cath does not have such a power, since Bob can always announce that ¬p: ¬〈[{a,c}]〉(¬Kc¬p∧
¬Kc p), or, equally, [〈{a,c}〉](Kc¬p∨Kc p).
Now, we provide formal definitions.
Definition 2.3. (Epistemic model) An epistemic model is a triple M = (W,∼,V ), where
• W is a non-empty set of states;
• ∼: A→P(W×W ) assigns an equivalence relation to each agent; we will denote relation assigned
to agent a ∈ A by ∼a;
• V : P→P(W ) assigns a set of states to each propositional variable.
1For readability, we use [c] rather than [{c}] for singleton coalitions.
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A pair (W,∼) is called an epistemic frame, and a pair (M,w) with w ∈W is called a pointed model.
An announcement in a pointed model (M,w) results in an updated pointed model (Mϕ ,w). Here Mϕ =
(Wϕ ,∼ϕ ,Vϕ), and Wϕ = JϕKM,∼ϕa=∼a ∩ (JϕKM×JϕKM), and Vϕ(p) =V (p)∩JϕKM. Generally speak-
ing, an updated pointed model (Mϕ ,w) is a restriction of the original one to the states where ϕ holds.
LetL GEL denote the set of formulas of the type
∧
i∈G Kiϕi, where for every i∈G it holds that ϕi ∈LEL.
We denote elements of L GEL as ψG. These are the formulas we will be quantifying over in modalities of
the form [G,χ] and [〈G〉].
Definition 2.4. (Semantics) Let a pointed model (M,w)with M = (W ,∼,V ), a∈A, and ϕ , ψ ∈LCoRGAL
be given.
(M,w) |= p iff w ∈V (p)
(M,w) |= ¬ϕ iff (M,w) 6|= ϕ
(M,w) |= ϕ ∧ψ iff (M,w) |= ϕ and (M,w) |= ψ
(M,w) |= Kaϕ iff ∀v ∈W : w∼a v implies (M,v) |= ϕ
(M,w) |= [ϕ]ψ iff (M,w) |= ϕ implies (Mϕ ,w) |= ψ
(M,w) |= [G,χ]ϕ iff (M,w) |= χ and ∀ψG : (M,w) |= [ψG∧χ]ϕ
(M,w) |= [〈G〉]ϕ iff ∀ψG∃χA\G : (M,w) |= ψG→ 〈ψG∧χA\G〉ϕ
Formula ϕ is called valid if for any pointed model (M,w) it holds that (M,w) |= ϕ .
The semantics for the ‘diamond’ versions of knowledge and public announcement operators (K̂aϕ
and 〈ϕ〉ψ) respectively) are obtained by changing ∀ to ∃ and ‘implies’ to ‘and’ in the corresponding
lines. The semantics for duals of relativised group announcements and coalition announcements is as
follows:
(M,w) |= 〈G,χ〉ϕ iff (M,w) |= χ implies ∃ψG : (M,w) |= 〈ψG∧χ〉ϕ
(M,w) |= 〈[G]〉ϕ iff ∃ψG∀χA\G : (M,w) |= ψG∧ [ψG∧χA\G]ϕ,
The existential version of the coalition announcement operator is read as ‘there is an announcement by
agents from G, such that whatever other agents A\G announce at the same time, ϕ holds.’
Note that semantics of coalition announcement operators are given in a ‘classic’ way. An equivalent
definition is possible using relativised group announcements.
(M,w) |= [〈G〉]ϕ iff ∀ψG : (M,w) |= 〈A\G,ψG〉ϕ
(M,w) |= 〈[G]〉ϕ iff ∃ψG : (M,w) |= [A\G,ψG]ϕ
We can use relativised group announcements to define classic group announcements: [G]ϕ↔ [G,>]ϕ
and 〈G〉ϕ ↔ 〈G,>〉ϕ .
Following [8, 7, 2, 3, 5, 9, 11, 4] we restrict formulas which agents in a group or coalition can
announce to formulas ofLEL. This allows us to avoid circularity in the definition.
2.2 Axiomatisation and Some Logical Properties
In this section we present an axiomatisation of CoRGAL and show its soundness. It is based on the
axiom systems for PAL, and have two additional axioms and four additional rules of inference.
Definition 2.5. The axiom system for CoRGAL is an extension of PAL with a relativised version of
GAL and interaction axioms.
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(A0) propositional tautologies,
(A1) Ka(ϕ → ψ)→ (Kaϕ → Kaψ),
(A2) Kaϕ → ϕ,
(A3) Kaϕ → KaKaϕ,
(A4) ¬Kaϕ → Ka¬Kaϕ,
(A5) [ϕ]p↔ (ϕ → p),
(A6) [ϕ]¬ψ ↔ (ϕ →¬[ϕ]ψ),
(A7) [ϕ](ψ ∧χ)↔ ([ϕ]ψ ∧ [ϕ]χ),
(A8) [ϕ]Kaψ ↔ (ϕ → Ka[ϕ]ψ),
(A9) [ϕ][ψ]χ ↔ [ϕ ∧ [ϕ]ψ]χ,
(A10) [G,χ]ϕ → χ ∧ [ψG∧χ]ϕ for any ψG,
(A11) [〈G〉]ϕ → 〈A\G,ψG〉ϕ for any ψG,
(R0) If ` ϕ and ` ϕ → ψ, then ` ψ,
(R1) If ` ϕ, then ` Kaϕ,
(R2) If ` ϕ, then ` [ψ]ϕ,
(R3) If ` ϕ, then ` [G,χ]ϕ,
(R4) If ` ϕ, then ` [〈G〉]ϕ,
(R5) If ∀ψG :` η(χ ∧ [ψG∧χ]ϕ), then ` η([G,χ]ϕ),
(R6) If ∀ψG :` η(〈A\G,ψG〉ϕ), then ` η([〈G〉]ϕ).
So, CoRGAL is the smallest subset ofLCoRGAL that contains all the axioms A0 – A11 and is closed
under rules of inference R0 – R6. Elements of CoRGAL are called theorems. Note that R5 and R6 are
infinitary rules: they require an infinite number of premises. Finding finite axiomatisations of any of
APAL, GAL, or CAL is an open problem. Note also that CoRGAL includes coalition logic [15], that
is all the axioms of the latter are validities of CoRGAL and a rule of inference preserves validity (see
Appendix A).
Definition 2.6. (Soundness and completeness) An axiomatisation is sound, if for any formula ϕ of the
language, it holds that ϕ ∈ CoRGAL implies ϕ is valid. And vice versa for completeness.
Soundness of A0–A4, R0, and R1 is due to soundness of S5. Axioms A5–A9 and rule of inference
R3 are sound, since PAL is sound [12]. We show soundness of R3–R6 in Proposition 2.8, and validity of
A10 and A11 in Proposition 2.7.
Proposition 2.7. Axioms A10 and A11 are valid.
Proof. Follows directly from the definition of semantics (Definition 2.4). We just show validity of (A11).
Assume that for some arbitrary pointed model (M,w) it holds that (M,w) |= [〈G〉]ϕ . By semantics
this is equivalent to ∀ψG,∃χA\G: (M,w) |= ψG→ 〈ψG∧ χA\G〉ϕ . Since ψG quantifies over all epistemic
formulas known to G, we can choose any particular ψG. Hence, we have that ∃χA\G: (M,w) |= ψG→
〈ψG∧χA\G〉ϕ , which is equivalent to (M,w) |= 〈A\G,ψG〉ϕ by semantics.
Proposition 2.8. R3, R4, R5, and R6 are sound, that is, they preserve validity.
Proof. A proof is given in Appendix B (Proposition B.1).
Next, we show some properties of CAL and GAL.
Whether CAL operators can be expressed in GAL is an open question. The most probable definition
of coalition announcements in terms of group announcements is 〈[G]〉ϕ ↔ 〈G〉[A\G]ϕ . Validity of this
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formula was stated to be an open question in [11, 5]. We partially settle this problem by proving one
direction.
Consider the left-to-right direction of the formula. In the antecedent all agents make a simultaneous
announcement, whereas in the consequent agents from A \G know the announcement ψG made by G.
Thus, in the updated model (MψG ,w) the agents in A\G may have learned some new epistemic formulas
χA\G that they did not know before the announcement. However, since ψG holds in the initial model, and
χA\G holds in the updated one, agents from A\G can always make an announcement in the initial model
that they know that after announcement of ψG, χA\G is true.
Returning to our example (Figure 1), whichever formulae ψ1 and ψ2 Ann and Bob announce, and
whichever formula ϕ Cath learns afterwards, she can always announce [ψ1 ∧ψ2]Kcϕ simultaneously
with them in the initial situation. Informally, if after Bob’s announcement of ¬p, Cath learns that ¬p,
she can announce: ‘If you say that ¬p holds, then I will know it,’ or [¬p]Kc¬p. We use this idea to prove
that if the agents in A\G can prevent ϕ after the announcement by G, then they could have prevented it
before.
Due to restriction of announcements to formulas of epistemic logic, we cannot directly employ public
announcement operators in agents’ ‘utterances.’ In order to avoid this, we use the standard translation of
PAL into epistemic logic.
Definition 2.9. Translation function t :LPAL→LEL [12] is defined as follows:
t(p) = p,
t(¬ϕ) = ¬t(ϕ),
t(ϕ ∧ψ) = t(ϕ)∧ t(ψ),
t(Kaϕ) = Kat(ϕ),
t([ϕ]p) = t(ϕ → p),
t([ϕ]¬ψ) = t(ϕ →¬[ϕ]ψ),
t([ϕ](ψ ∧χ)) = t([ϕ]ψ ∧ [ϕ]χ),
t([ϕ]Kaψ) = t(ϕ → Ka[ϕ]ψ),
t([ϕ][ψ]χ) = t([ϕ ∧ [ϕ]ψ]χ).
Every ϕ ∈LPAL is equivalent to t(ϕ) ∈LEL.
Proposition 2.10. 〈[G]〉ϕ → 〈G〉[A\G]ϕ is valid.
Proof. Assume that for some pointed model (M,w) it holds that (M,w) |= 〈[G]〉ϕ . By the semantics of
CAL this is equivalent to
∃ψG,∀χA\G : (M,w) |= ψG∧ [ψG∧χA\G]ϕ.
Since χA\G quantifies over all possible announcements by A\G, it also quantifies over a specific subset
of these announcements — KA\G[ψG]χ ′A\G :=
∧
a∈A\G Ka[ψG]χ ′a for some ψG and for all χ ′a ∈LEL.
Hence ∃ψG,∀χA\G: (M,w) |= ψG∧ [ψG∧χA\G]ϕ implies
∃ψG,∀χ ′A\G : (M,w) |= ψG∧ [ψG∧KA\G[ψG]χ ′A\G]ϕ.
Note that KA\G[ψG]χ ′A\G is not an epistemic formula per se. It is equivalent, however, to an epistemic
formula of type KA\GχA\G, where χA\G ∈LEL, via translation t(KA\G[ψG]χ ′A\G) (Definition 2.9). Thus
we have that
∃ψG,∀χ ′A\G : (M,w) |= ψG∧ [ψG∧ t(KA\G[ψG]χ ′A\G)]ϕ.
Let us consider announcement ψG∧ t(KA\G[ψG]χ ′A\G). By propositional reasoning it is equivalent to
ψG∧(ψG→ t(KA\G[ψG]χ ′A\G)). Since ψG is an epistemic formula, the latter is equivalent to ψG∧t(ψG→
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KA\G[ψG]χ ′A\G). Applying the PAL axiom [ψ]Kaϕ ↔ (ψ → Ka[ψ]ϕ), we get ψG ∧ t([ψG]KA\Gχ ′A\G),
which is equivalent to ψG∧ [ψG]KA\Gχ ′A\G. Finally, we have that
∃ψG,∀χ ′A\G : (M,w) |= ψG∧ [ψG∧ [ψG]KA\Gχ ′A\G]ϕ.
Using the axiom [ψ][χ]ϕ ↔ [ψ ∧ [ψ]χ]ϕ , we get
∃ψG,∀χ ′A\G : (M,w) |= ψG∧ [ψG][KA\Gχ ′A\G]ϕ,
where χ ′A\G ∈LEL. The latter is equivalent (M,w) |= 〈G〉[A\G]ϕ due to validity |= ψ ∧ [ψ]ϕ ↔ 〈ψ〉ϕ
and by the semantics of GAL.
Intuition suggests that various groups and coalitions of agents, when united, can do no worse than if
they were acting on their own. In the remaining part of this section we show that this intuition is indeed
true.
We start with a somewhat obvious statement: if some configuration of a model can be achieved by a
coalition, then the configuration can be achieved by a superset of the coalition.
Proposition 2.11. 〈[G]〉ϕ → 〈[G∪H]〉ϕ , where G,H ⊆ A, is valid.
Proof. Appendix, Proposition B.2.
It was shown in [2] that 〈G〉ϕ ↔ 〈G〉〈G〉ϕ . This property demonstrates that within the framework
of GAL a multiple-step strategy of a group can be executed in a single step. Whether this is true for
CAL is an open question. We show, however, that if truth of some ϕ can be achieved by two consecutive
coalition announcements by G, then whatever agents from A\G announce, they cannot preclude G from
making ϕ true.
Proposition 2.12. 〈[G]〉〈[G]〉ϕ → [〈A\G〉]ϕ is valid.
Proof. Appendix, Proposition B.3.
Whether 〈[G]〉〈[G]〉ϕ → 〈[G]〉ϕ is valid is an open question. We conjecture that the property is not
valid. Consider 〈[G]〉〈[G]〉ϕ: after initial announcement, coalition G has a consecutive announcement
to make ϕ true. This announcement, however, depends on the choice of A \G in the first operator. In
other words, consecutive announcement by G may vary depending on the initial announcement by A\G.
Hence, it seems highly counterintuitive that G has a single announcement that can incorporate all possible
simultaneous announcements by A\G in a general (infinite) case.
Formula 〈G〉〈H〉ϕ → 〈G∪H〉ϕ is a validity of GAL [2]. Again, it is unknown whether the same
property holds for coalition operators, and, for the same reasons as for Proposition 2.12, we conjecture
that the corresponding formula is not valid in CAL.
Proposition 2.13. 〈[G]〉〈[H]〉ϕ → [〈A\ (G∪H)〉]ϕ is valid.
Proof. Let (M,w) |= 〈[G]〉〈[H]〉ϕ . By Proposition 2.11 applied twice, we have (M,w) |= 〈[G∪H]〉〈[G∪
H]〉ϕ , and by Proposition 2.12, the latter implies (M,w) |= [〈A\ (G∪H)〉]ϕ .
Next, we show that splitting an announcement by a unified coalition into consecutive announcements
of sub-coalitions may decrease their power to force certain outcomes. Whether 〈[G∪H]〉ϕ→〈[G]〉〈[H]〉ϕ
is valid was mentioned as an open question in [5]. We settle this problem by presenting a counterexample.
Proposition 2.14. 〈[G∪H]〉ϕ → 〈[G]〉〈[H]〉ϕ is not valid.
8 Coalition and Group Announcement Logic
Proof. Let G = {a},H = {b}, and ϕ := Kb(p∧q∧ r)∧¬Ka(p∧q∧ r)∧¬Kc(p∧q∧ r). Formula ϕ says
that agent b knows that the given propositional variables are true, and agents a and c do not. Consider
model (M, pqr) in Figure 2 (reflexive and transitive arrows are omitted for convenience). Names of the
states in the model show values of propositional variables; for example, (M, pqr) |= p∧¬q∧ r.
pqr
pqrpqr pqr
ca,c
c
b
Figure 2: Counterexample
By the semantics (M, pqr) |= 〈[{a,b}]〉ϕ if and only if ∃ψa,∃ψb,∀χc : (M, pqr) |= ψa ∧ψb ∧ [ψa ∧
ψb ∧ χc]ϕ . Let ψa be Kaq, and ψb be Kb>. Observe that (M, pqr) |= Kaq∧Kb>. This announcement
leads to b learning that q. Moreover, c does not know any formula that she can announce to avoid ϕ .
An informal argument is as follows. By announcing Kaq agent a ‘chooses’ a union of a-equivalence
classes {pqr, pqr, pqr} (and b ‘chooses’ the whole model). Any simultaneous ‘choice’ of c includes
{pqr, pqr, pqr} as a subset. Thus, intersection of {pqr, pqr, pqr} and any of unions of c-equivalence
classes is {pqr, pqr, pqr}, and ϕ is true in such a restriction of the model.
Let us show that (M, pqr) 6|= 〈[{a}]〉〈[{b}]〉ϕ , or, equivalently, (M, pqr) |= [〈{a}〉][〈{b}〉]¬ϕ . Accord-
ing to the semantics, ∀ψa,∃χb,∃χc: (M, pqr) |= ψa → 〈ψa ∧ χb ∧ χc〉[〈{b}〉]¬ϕ . Assume that for an
arbitrary ψa, announcements by b and c are Kb p and Kc> correspondingly. Then (M, pqr) |= ψa∧ [ψa∧
Kb p∧Kc>][〈{b}〉]¬ϕ . Note that no matter what a announces, Kb p ‘forces’ her to learn that p∧q∧ r, and
whatever is announced in the updated model (Mψa∧Kb p∧Kc>, pqr), a’s knowledge of p∧q∧ r and, hence,
falsity of ϕ remains. Thus we reached a contradiction.
The same counterexample can be used to demonstrate that [〈A\(G∪H)〉]ϕ→〈[G]〉〈[H]〉ϕ is not valid,
where A\ (G∪H) = {c}. In the proof the Proposition 2.14 we show that (M, pqr) |= 〈[{a,b}]〉ϕ . Using
validity 〈[G]〉ϕ → [〈A\G〉]ϕ we obtain (M, pqr) |= [〈c〉]ϕ . The rest of the proof remains the same.
Corollary 2.15. [〈A\ (G∪H)〉]ϕ → 〈[G]〉〈[H]〉ϕ is not valid.
2.3 Completeness
In order to prove completeness of CoRGAL, we expand and modify the completeness proof for APAL
[7, 9, 6]. Although the proof is partially based upon the classic canonical model approach, we have to
ensure that construction of maximal consistent theories (Proposition 2.20) allows us to include infinite
amount of formulas for cases of coalition announcements. This is possible due to axioms A10, A11 and
rules of inference R5,R6. After that we use induction on complexity of CoRGAL formulas to prove the
Truth Lemma.
First, we prove a useful auxiliary lemma.
Lemma 2.16. Let ϕ,ψ ∈LCoRGAL. If ϕ → ψ is a theorem, then η(ϕ)→ η(ψ) is a theorem as well.
Proof. Appendix, Lemma B.4.
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Now, the first part of the proof up to Proposition 2.20 is based on [7]. Here we introduce theories and
prove the Lindenbaum Lemma.
Definition 2.17. A set of formulas x is called a theory if and only if it contains CoRGAL, and is closed
under R0,R5, and R6. A theory x is consistent if and only if ⊥ 6∈ x, and is maximal if and only if for all
ϕ ∈LCoRGAL it holds that either ϕ ∈ x or ¬ϕ ∈ x.
Note that theories are not closed under necessitation rules. The reason for this is that while these
rules preserve validity, they do not preserve truth, whereas R0,R5, and R6 preserve both validity and
truth.
Proposition 2.18. Let x be a theory, ϕ,ψ ∈LCoRGAL, and a ∈ A. The following are theories: x+ϕ =
{ψ : ϕ → ψ ∈ x},Kax = {ϕ : Kaϕ ∈ x}, and [ϕ]x = {ψ : [ϕ]ψ ∈ x}.
Proof. Appendix, Proposition B.5.
Proposition 2.19. Let ϕ ∈LCoRGAL. Then CoRGAL+ϕ is consistent iff ¬ϕ 6∈ CoRGAL.
Proof. Appendix, Proposition B.6
The following proposition is a variation of the Lindenbaum Lemma. In order to prove it, we rely
heavily on rules of inference R5 and R6.
Lemma 2.20 (Lindenbaum). Every consistent theory x can be extended to a maximal consistent theory
y.
Proof. Let ψ0,ψ1, . . . be an enumeration of formulas of the language, and let y0 = x. Suppose that for
some n≥ 0, yn is a consistent theory, and x⊆ yn. If yn+ψn is consistent, then yn+1 = yn+ψn. Otherwise,
if ψn is not a conclusion of either R5 or R6, yn+1 = y.
If ψn is a conclusion of R5, we enumerate all the subformulas of ψn which contain relativised group
announcement modalities [G,χ]. Let η1([G,χ]ϕ1), . . . , ηk([G,χ]ϕk) be all these subformulas. Then
y0n, . . . ,y
k
n is a sequence of consistent theories, where y
0
n = yn, and for some i< k, y
i
n is a consistent theory
containing yn and ¬ηi([G,χ]ϕi). Since yin is closed under R5, there exists ψG such that ηi(χ ∧ [ψG ∧
χ]ϕi) 6∈ yin. Hence, yi+1n = yin +¬ηi(χ ∧ [ψG ∧ χ]ϕi), and yn+1 = ykn. Note that adding such a witness
ψG corresponds to the semantics of relativised group announcements, i.e. for formula ηi{〈G,χ〉¬ϕi} we
have ψG such that ηi{χ → 〈ψG∧χ〉¬ϕi}.
Now we consider the case when ψn is a conclusion of R6. We enumerate all the subformulas of ψn
which contain coalition announcement modalities [〈G〉]. Let η1([〈G〉]ϕ1), . . ., ηk([〈G〉]ϕk) be all these
subformulas. Then y0n, . . . ,y
k
n is a sequence of consistent theories, where y
0
n = yn, and for some i <
k, yin is a consistent theory containing yn and ¬ηi([〈G〉]ϕi). Since yin is closed under R6, there exists
ψG such that ηi(〈A \G,ψG〉ϕi) 6∈ yin. Hence, yi+1n = yin +¬ηi(〈A \G,ψG〉ϕi), and yn+1 = ykn. Note
that since for all χA\G: η([A \G,ψG]ϕ)→ η(ψG ∧ [ψG ∧ χA\G]ϕ) are theorems, these formulas and
their contrapositions (due to Proposition 2.16) are already in yin (because y
i
n is a theory). Thus, adding
¬ηi(〈A \G,ψG〉ϕi) to yin adds all the ¬ηi(ψG → 〈ψG ∧ χA\G〉ϕi) for χA\G as well. This satisfies the
semantics of coalition announcements, i.e. for formula ηi{〈[G]〉¬ϕi} we have some ψG such that for all
χA\G: ηi{ψG∧ [ψG∧χA\G]¬ϕi}.
Finally, y is a maximal consistent theory, and x⊆ y.
The rest of the proof is an expansion of the one from [9]. It employs induction on complexity of
formulae to prove the Truth Lemma (Proposition 2.27) and, ultimately, completeness (Proposition 2.28)
of CoRGAL.
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Definition 2.21. The size of some formula ϕ ∈LCoRGAL is defined as follows:
1. Size(p) = 1,
2. Size(¬ϕ) = Size(Kaϕ) = Size([G,χ]ϕ) = Size([〈G〉]ϕ) = Size(ϕ)+1,
3. Size(ϕ ∧ψ) = Size(ϕ)+Size(ψ)+1,
4. Size([ψ]ϕ) = Size(ψ)+3 ·Size(ϕ).
The [, ]-depth is defined as follows:
1. d[,](p) = 0,
2. d[,](¬ϕ) = d[,](Kaϕ) = d[,]([〈G〉]ϕ) = d[,](ϕ),
3. d[,](ϕ ∧ψ) = max{d[,](ϕ),d[,](ψ)},
4. d[,]([ψ]ϕ) = d[,](ψ)+d[,](ϕ),
5. d[,]([G,χ]ϕ) = d[,](χ)+d[,](ϕ)+1.
The [〈〉]-depth is the same as [, ], with the following exceptions.
1. d[〈〉]([G,χ]ϕ) = d[〈〉](χ)+d[〈〉](ϕ),
2. d[〈〉]([〈G〉]ϕ) = d[〈〉](ϕ)+1.
Definition 2.22. The binary relation <Size[,],[〈〉] between ϕ,ψ ∈LCoRGAL is defined as follows: ϕ <Size[,],[〈〉] ψ
iff d[〈〉](ϕ)< d[〈〉](ψ), or, otherwise, d[〈〉](ϕ) = d[〈〉](ψ), and either d[,](ϕ)< d[,](ψ), or d[,](ϕ) = d[,](ψ) and
Size(ϕ)< Size(ψ). The relation is a well-founded strict partial order between formulae. Note that for all
epistemic formulas ψ we have that d[,](ψ) = d[〈〉](ψ) = 0.
We need the following proposition the for Truth Lemma.
Proposition 2.23. Let ψG, G⊆ A, and χ,ϕ,τ ∈ CoRGAL.
1. χ ∧ [ψG∧χ]ϕ <Size[,],[〈〉] [G,χ]ϕ ,
2. [τ](χ ∧ [ψG∧χ]ϕ)<Size[,],[〈〉] [τ][G,χ]ϕ ,
3. 〈A\G,ψG〉ϕ <Size[,],[〈〉] [〈G〉]ϕ ,
4. [τ]〈A\G,ψG〉ϕ <Size[,],[〈〉] [τ][〈G〉]ϕ .
Proof. Appendix, Proposition B.7.
Definition 2.24. The canonical model is the model MC = (WC,∼C,VC), where
• WC is the set of all maximal consistent theories,
• ∼C is defined as x∼Ca y iff Kax = Kay,
• x ∈VC(p) iff p ∈ x.
Relation ∼C is equivalence due to axioms A2, A3, and A4.
Definition 2.25. Let ϕ ∈ LCoRGAL. Condition P(ϕ): for all maximal consistent theories x, ϕ ∈ x iff
(MC,x) |= ϕ . Condition H(ϕ): for all ψ ∈LCoRGAL, if ψ <Size[,],[〈〉] ϕ , then P(ψ).
Proposition 2.26. For all ϕ ∈LCoRGAL, if H(ϕ), then P(ϕ).
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Proof. Suppose H(ϕ) holds, and let x be a maximal consistent theory. The proof is by induction on
<Size[,],[〈〉]-complexity of formulae. Most of the cases were proved in [9]. We prove here only the remaining
instances involving realtivised group and coalition announcements.
Case ϕ0 = [G,χ]ϕ . Suppose that [G,χ]ϕ ∈ x. Since x is a theory, by axiom A10 we have that ∀ψG:
χ ∧ [ψG∧ χ]ϕ ∈ x. By the fact that χ ∧ [ψG∧ χ]ϕ <Size[,],[〈〉] [G,χ]ϕ and the Induction Hypothesis, we have
(MC,x) |= χ ∧ [ψG∧χ]ϕ for all ψG. The latter is equivalent to (MC,x) |= [G,χ]ϕ by semantics.
Case ϕ0 = [τ][G,χ]ϕ . Assume that [τ][G,χ]ϕ ∈ x. Note that [τ][G,χ]ϕ is a necessity form. Since x is
a maximal consistent theory and, hence, closed under R5, we conclude that ∀ψG: [τ](χ∧ [ψG∧χ]ϕ)∈ x.
Next, by Proposition 2.23 and the Induction Hypothesis we have that (MC,x) |= [τ](χ ∧ [ψG∧ χ]ϕ) for
all ψG. The latter amounts to the fact that (MC,x) |= τ implies (MC,x)τ |= χ ∧ [ψG∧ χ]ϕ for all ψG. By
the semantics of CoRGAL, we have that (MC,x) |= τ implies (MC,x)τ |= [G,χ]ϕ , which is equivalent
to (MC,x) |= [τ][G,χ]ϕ .
Case ϕ0 = [〈G〉]ϕ . Suppose that [〈G〉]ϕ ∈ x. Since x is a theory and by axiom A11 we have that ∀ψG:
〈A \G,ψG〉ϕ ∈ x. By the fact that 〈A \G,ψG〉ϕ <Size[,],[〈〉] [〈G〉]ϕ and the Induction Hypothesis, we have
∀ψG: (MC,x) |= 〈A\G,ψG〉ϕ . The latter is ∀ψG,∃χA\G: (MC,x) |= ψG→ 〈ψG∧ χA\G〉ϕ by semantics,
which is equivalent to (MC,x) |= [〈G〉]ϕ .
Case ϕ0 = [τ][〈G〉]ϕ . Assume that [τ][〈G〉]ϕ ∈ x. Note that [τ][〈G〉]ϕ is a necessity form. Since x is
a maximal consistent theory and, hence, closed under R6, we conclude that ∀ψG: [τ](〈A\G,ψG〉ϕ) ∈ x.
Next, by Proposition 2.23 and the Induction Hypothesis we have that (MC,x) |= [τ](〈A \G,ψG〉ϕ) for
all ψG. The latter amounts to the fact that (MC,x) |= τ implies (MC,x)τ |= 〈A\G,ψG〉ϕ for all ψG. By
the semantics of CoRGAL, we have that (MC,x) |= τ implies (MC,x)τ |= [〈G〉]ϕ , which is equivalent to
(MC,x) |= [τ][〈G〉]ϕ .
Proposition 2.26 implies the following fact.
Proposition 2.27. Let ϕ ∈LCoRGAL, and x be a maximal consistent theory. Then ϕ ∈ x iff (MC,x) |= ϕ .
Finally, we prove the completeness of CoRGAL.
Proposition 2.28. For all ϕ ∈LCoRGAL, if ϕ is valid, then ϕ ∈ CoRGAL.
Proof. Towards a contradiction, suppose that ϕ is valid and ϕ 6∈CoRGAL. Since CoRGAL is a consis-
tent theory, and by Propositions 2.18 and 2.19, we have that CoRGAL+¬ϕ is a consistent theory. Then,
by Proposition 2.20, there exists a maximal consistent theory x⊇ CoRGAL+¬ϕ such that ¬ϕ ∈ x. By
Proposition 2.27, this means that (MC,x) 6|= ϕ , which contradicts ϕ being a validity.
3 Conclusion
We presented CoRGAL and provided a complete axiomatisation for it. Validity of 〈[G]〉ϕ→〈G〉[A\G]ϕ
has also been proven. Whether the other direction valid is an open question. Answering it either way,
positively, or negatively, will allow us to understand better mutual expressivity of CAL and GAL. The
axiomatisation of CoRGAL we presented is infinitary and employs necessity forms. Finding a finitary
axiomatisation is yet another open problem. An interesting avenue of further research is adding common
and distributed knowledge operators to CoRGAL in the vein of [1]. Additionally, since it is known that
GAL, CAL [5], and hence CoRGAL, are undecidable, a search for decidable fragments of these logics
is another research question. We would also like to investigate applicability of logics with group and
coalition announcements to epistemic planning [10]. Finally, a complete axiomatisation of CAL without
relativised group announcement operators has not been provided yet, and it is an intriguing direction of
further research.
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A Coalition and Group Annoucement Logic Subsumes Coalition Logic
Definition A.1. Axiomatisation of CL is as follows:
(C0) all instantiation of propositional tautologies,
(C1) ¬〈[G]〉⊥,
(C2) 〈[G]〉>,
(C3) ¬〈[ /0]〉¬ϕ → 〈[A]〉ϕ,
(C4) 〈[G]〉(ϕ ∧ψ)→ 〈[G]〉ϕ,
(C5) 〈[G]〉ϕ ∧〈[H]〉ψ → 〈[G∪H]〉(ϕ ∧ψ), if G∩H = /0,
(R0) ` ϕ,ϕ → ψ ⇒` ψ,
(R1) ` ϕ ↔ ψ ⇒` 〈[G]〉ϕ ↔ 〈[G]〉ψ.
Proposition A.2. CoRGAL contains CL.
Proof. C0 and R0 are obvious.
C1: It holds that |= >, and > is true in every restriction of a model, i.e. |= [ψ]>. In particular,
for some model (M,w) and all true formulas ψG and χA\G: (M,w) |= 〈ψG∧ χA\G〉>. We can relax the
requirement of ψG being true by adding the formula as an antecedent. Formally, for all (true and false)
ψG and some (true) χA\G: (M,w) |=ψG→〈ψG∧χA\G〉>. The latter is (M,w) |= [〈G〉]> by the semantics,
and this is equivalent to (M,w) |= ¬〈[G]〉⊥ by the duality of the coalition announcement operators.
C2: For any pointed model (M,w) and any announcement ψG ∧ χA\G it holds that (M,w) |= [ψG ∧
χA\G]>. The latter implies that for some true ψG and for all χA\G: (M,w) |= ψG∧ [ψG∧ χA\G]>, which
is (M,w) |= 〈[G]〉> by the semantics.
C3: Let ¬〈[ /0]〉¬ϕ be true in some arbitrary pointed model (M,w). This is equivalent to ∃ψA:
(M,w) |= ¬[ψA]¬ϕ , which is (M,w) |= 〈[A]〉ϕ by the semantics.
C4: Suppose that for some (M,w), (M,w) |= 〈[G]〉(ϕ1 ∧ϕ2) holds. By the semantics, ∃ψG,∀χA\G:
(M,w) |= ψG ∧ [ψG ∧ χA\G](ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2). Then, by axiom of PAL [ψ](ϕ ∧ χ)↔ [ψ]ϕ ∧ [ψ]χ , we have
∃ψG,∀χA\G: (M,w) |= ψG ∧ [ψG ∧ χA\G]ϕ1 ∧ [ψG ∧ χA\G]ϕ2. The latter implies ∃ψG,∀χA\G: (M,w) |=
ψG∧ [ψG∧χA\G]ϕ1, which is (M,w) |= 〈[G]〉ϕ1 by the semantics.
C5: Assume that for some (M,w) we have that (M,w) |= 〈[G]〉ϕ1 ∧ 〈[H]〉ϕ2. Let us consider the
first conjunct (M,w) |= 〈[G]〉ϕ1. By the semantics it is equivalent to ∃ψG,∀χA\G: (M,w) |= ψG∧ [ψG∧
χA\G]ϕ1. Since G∩H = /0, we can split χA\G into χH and χA\G∪H . Thus we have that ∃ψG,∀χH ,∀χA\(G∪H):
(M,w) |= ψG∧ [ψG∧χH ∧χA\(G∪H)]ϕ1. The same holds for the second conjunct: ∃ψH ,∀χG,∀χA\(G∪H):
(M,w) |= ψH ∧ [ψH ∧χG∧χA\(G∪H)]ϕ2. Since χH (χG) quantifies over all formulas known to H (G), we
can substitute χH (χG) with ψH (ψG). Hence we have
∃ψG,∃ψH ,∀χA\(G∪H) :
(M,w) |= ψG∧ψH ∧ [ψG∧ψH ∧χA\(G∪H)]ϕ1∧ [ψG∧ψH ∧χA\G∪H ]ϕ2.
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By the axiom of PAL [ψ](ϕ ∧χ)↔ [ψ]ϕ ∧ [ψ]χ , we have that
∃ψG,∃ψH ,∀χA\(G∪H) : (M,w) |= ψG∧ψH ∧ [ψG∧ψH ∧χA\(G∪H)](ϕ1∧ϕ2),
and the latter is equivalent to (M,w) |= 〈[G∪H]〉(ϕ1∧ϕ2) by the semantics.
R1: Assume that |= ϕ ↔ ψ . This means that for any pointed model (M,w) the following holds:
(M,w) |= ϕ iff (M,w) |= ψ (1). Now suppose that for some pointed model (M,v) it holds that (M,v) |=
〈[G]〉ϕ . By the semantics, ∃ψG,∀χA\G: (M,v) |=ψG∧ [ψG∧χA\G]ϕ , which is equivalent to the following:
(M,v) |= ψG and ((M,v) |= ψG ∧ χA\G implies (MψG∧χA\G ,v) |= ϕ). By (1) we have that ∃ψG,∀χA\G:
(M,v) |= ψG and ((M,v) |= ψG ∧ χA\G implies (MψG∧χA\G ,v) |= ψ), which is (M,v) |= 〈[G]〉ψ by the
semantics. The same argument holds in the other direction.
B Proofs of Propositions
Proposition B.1. R3, R4, R5, and R6 are sound, that is, they preserve validity.
Proof. Proofs of R3 and R4 are similar, and we present only the proof for R3.
(R4) Assume |= ϕ . Since public announcements preserve validity, we have that for any (M,w) and
ψ , (M,w) |= [ψ]ϕ . Since ψ is arbitrary, we have that for all ψG and χA\G (M,w) |= [ψG∧ χA\G]ϕ . The
latter implies that for some true ψG it holds that (M,w) |= ψG∧ [ψG∧χA\G]ϕ , which is (M,w) |= [〈G〉]ϕ
by the semantics. Since (M,w) was arbitrary, we conclude that |= [〈G〉]ϕ .
(R5) Let (M,w) be an arbitrary pointed model, and let some χ be given. We proceed by induction on
η .
Base case. For all ψG we have that (M,w) |= χ ∧ [ψG∧ χ]ϕ . This is equivalent to (M,w) |= [G,χ]ϕ
by semantics.
Induction Hypothesis. Assume that the rule preserves validity for all formulas η(χ ∧ [ψG∧χ]ϕ) and
all pointed models (M,w).
Case ∀ψG: τ→ η(χ∧ [ψG∧χ]ϕ) for some τ ∈LCoRGAL. This means that (M,w) |=¬τ or (M,w) |=
η(χ ∧ [ψG ∧ χ]ϕ). By the Induction Hypothesis we have that (M,w) |= ¬τ or (M,w) |= η([G,χ]ϕ),
which is equivalent to (M,w) |= τ → η([G,χ]ϕ).
Case ∀ψG: Kaη(χ ∧ [ψG ∧ χ]ϕ) for some a ∈ A. By semantics we have that for every v ∈ W :
(w,v) ∈∼a implies (M,v) |= η(χ ∧ [ψG∧χ]ϕ). By the Induction Hypothesis we conclude that for every
v ∈W : (w,v) ∈∼a implies (M,v) |= η([G,χ]ϕ), which is equivalent to (M,w) |= Kaη([G,χ]ϕ).
Case ∀ψG: [τ]η(χ ∧ [ψG ∧ χ]ϕ) for some τ ∈ LCoRGAL. This means that (M,w) |= τ implies
(Mτ ,w) |= η(χ ∧ [ψG∧ χ]ϕ). By the Induction Hypothesis we have that (M,w) |= τ implies (Mτ ,w) |=
η([G,χ]ϕ), which is equivalent to (M,w) |= [τ]η([G,χ]ϕ).
(R6) Let (M,w) be an arbitrary pointed model. We proceed by induction on η .
Base case. For all ψG we have that (M,w) |= 〈A\G,ψG〉ϕ . This is equivalent to (M,w) |= [〈G〉]ϕ by
the alternative semantics using relativised group announcements.
Induction Hypothesis. Assume that the rule preserves validity for all formulas η(〈A\G,ψG〉ϕ) and
all pointed models (M,w).
Case ∀ψG: τ → η(〈A\G,ψG〉ϕ) for some τ ∈LCoRGAL. This means that (M,w) |= ¬τ or (M,w) |=
η(〈A\G,ψG〉ϕ). By the Induction Hypothesis we have that (M,w) |= ¬τ or (M,w) |= η([〈G〉]ϕ), which
is equivalent to (M,w) |= τ → η([〈G〉]ϕ).
Case ∀ψG: Kaη(〈A \G,ψG〉ϕ) for some a ∈ A. By semantics we have that for every v ∈ W :
(w,v) ∈∼a implies (M,v) |= η(〈A \G,ψG〉ϕ). By the Induction Hypothesis we conclude that for ev-
ery v ∈W : (w,v) ∈∼a implies (M,v) |= η([〈G〉]ϕ), which is equivalent to (M,w) |= Kaη([〈G〉]ϕ).
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Case ∀ψG: [τ]η(〈A\G,ψG〉ϕ) for some τ ∈LCoRGAL. This means that (M,w) |= τ implies (Mτ ,w) |=
η(〈A \G,ψG〉ϕ). By the Induction Hypothesis we have that (M,w) |= τ implies (Mτ ,w) |= η([〈G〉]ϕ),
which is equivalent to (M,w) |= [τ]η([〈G〉]ϕ).
Proposition B.2. 〈[G]〉ϕ → 〈[G∪H]〉ϕ , where G,H ⊆ A, is valid.
Proof. Let (M,w) |= 〈[G]〉ϕ for some arbitrary (M,w). By the semantics of CAL this is equivalent to
∃ψG,∀χA\G : (M,w) |= ψG∧ [ψG∧χA\G]ϕ.
Let us consider formula χA\G: since A \G = A \ (G∪H)∪H \G, we can ‘unpack’ the formula into
χA\(G∪H) and χH\G. Hence we have
∃ψG,∀χH\G,∀χA\(G∪H) : (M,w) |= ψG∧ [ψG∧χH\G∧χA\(G∪H)]ϕ.
The latter implies
∃ψG,∃>H\G,∀χA\(G∪H) : (M,w) |= ψG∧>H\G∧ [ψG∧>H\G∧χA\(G∪H)]ϕ,
where >H\G :=
∧
a∈H\G Ka>. Combining ψG and >H\G into a single announcement ψG∪H by the united
coalition G∪H, we conclude that
∃ψG∪H ,∀χA\(G∪H) : (M,w) |= ψG∪H ∧ [ψG∪H ∧χA\(G∪H)]ϕ.
This is equivalent to (M,w) |= 〈[G∪H]〉ϕ by semantics.
Proposition B.3. 〈[G]〉〈[G]〉ϕ → [〈A\G〉]ϕ is valid.
Proof. Suppose that for some (M,w) it holds that (M,w) |= 〈[G]〉〈[G]〉ϕ . This is equivalent to
∃ψG,∀χA\G,∃ψ ′G,∀χ ′A\G : (M,w) |= ψG∧ [ψG∧χA\G](ψ ′G∧ [ψ ′G∧χ ′A\G]ϕ).
Since χ ′A\G quantifies over all epistemic formulas known to A \G, it also quantifies over >A\G :=∧
a∈A\G Ka>. Hence it is implied that
∃ψG,∀χA\G,∃ψ ′G : (M,w) |= ψG∧ [ψG∧χA\G](ψ ′G∧ [ψ ′G∧>A\G]ϕ),
which is equivalent to
∃ψG,∀χA\G,∃ψ ′G : (M,w) |= ψG∧ [ψG∧χA\G]ψ ′G∧ [ψG∧χA\G][ψ ′G]ϕ.
Using PAL validity [ψ]χ ∧ [ψ][χ]ϕ ↔ [ψ]χ ∧ [ψ]〈χ〉ϕ , we get
∃ψG,∀χA\G,∃ψ ′G : (M,w) |= ψG∧ [ψG∧χA\G]ψ ′G∧ [ψG∧χA\G]〈ψ ′G〉ϕ.
Next, we use PAL validity [ψ]ϕ ↔ (ψ → 〈ψ〉ϕ):
∃ψG,∀χA\G,∃ψ ′G : (M,w) |= ψG∧ [ψG∧χA\G]ψ ′G∧ (ψG∧χA\G→ 〈ψG∧χA\G〉〈ψ ′G〉ϕ).
By propositional reasoning the latter implies
∃ψG,∀χA\G,∃ψ ′G : (M,w) |= ψG∧ (ψG→ (χA\G→ 〈ψG∧χA\G〉〈ψ ′G〉ϕ),
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and this implies
∃ψG,∀χA\G,∃ψ ′G : (M,w) |= χA\G→ 〈ψG∧χA\G〉〈ψ ′G〉ϕ.
Finally, by PAL axiom 〈ψ〉〈χ〉ϕ ↔ 〈ψ ∧ [ψ]χ〉ϕ , we have that
∃ψG,∀χA\G,∃ψ ′G : (M,w) |= χA\G→ 〈ψG∧χA\G∧ [ψG∧χA\G]ψ ′G〉ϕ.
We can move ∃ψG within the scope of ∀χA\G, and morph ψG and [ψG ∧ χA\G]ψ ′G into a single
announcement by G.
The latter is (M,w) |= [〈A\G〉]ϕ by the semantics of CAL.
Lemma B.4. Let ϕ,ψ ∈LCoRGAL. If ϕ → ψ is a theorem, then η(ϕ)→ η(ψ) is a theorem as well.
Proof. Assume that ϕ → ψ is a theorem. We prove the lemma by induction on η .
Base case η := ]. Formula ϕ → ψ is a theorem by assumption.
Induction Hypothesis. Assume that for some η , η(ϕ)→ η(ψ) is a theorem.
Case (τ → η(ϕ)) → (τ → η(ψ)) for some τ ∈ LCoRGAL. Formula (η(ϕ) → η(ψ)) → ((τ →
η(ϕ))→ (τ → η(ψ))) is a propositional tautology, and, hence, a theorem of CoRGAL. Using the
Induction Hypothesis and R0, we have that (τ → η(ϕ))→ (τ → η(ψ)) is a theorem.
Case (Kaη(ϕ))→ (Kaη(ψ)) for some a∈ A. Since η(ϕ)→ η(ψ) is a theorem by the Induction Hy-
pothesis, Ka(η(ϕ)→ η(ψ)) is also a theorem by R1. Next, Ka(η(ϕ)→ η(ψ))→ (Kaη(ϕ)→ Kaη(ψ))
is an instance of A1, and, hence, a theorem. Finally, using R0 we have that Kaη(ϕ)→ Kaη(ψ) is a
theorem.
Case ([τ]η(ϕ))→ ([τ]η(ψ)) for some τ ∈LCoRGAL. Formula [τ](η(ϕ)→ η(ψ))→ ([τ]η(ϕ)→
[τ]η(ψ)) is a theorem of PAL (see [12, Chapter 4]), and hence of CoRGAL. Using the Induction Hy-
pothesis and R0 we conclude that [τ]η(ϕ)→ [τ]η(ψ) is also a theorem of CoRGAL.
Proposition B.5. Let x be a theory, ϕ,ψ ∈LCoRGAL, and a ∈ A. The following are theories: x+ϕ =
{ψ : ϕ → ψ ∈ x},Kax = {ϕ : Kaϕ ∈ x}, and [ϕ]x = {ψ : [ϕ]ψ ∈ x}.
Proof. The proof is an extension of the one from [7]. We show that corresponding sets are closed under
R5 and R6.
Case x+ϕ . Suppose that η(χ ∧ [ψG ∧ χ]τ) ∈ x+ϕ for some given χ , for all ψG, and for some
τ ∈LCoRGAL. This means that ϕ → η(χ ∧ [ψG ∧ χ]τ) ∈ x for all ψG. Since ϕ → η(χ ∧ [ψG ∧ χ]τ) is
a necessity form, and x is closed under R5 (by Definition 2.17), we infer that ϕ → η([G,χ]τ) ∈ x, and,
consequently, η([G,χ]τ) ∈ x+ϕ . So, x+ϕ is closed under R5.
Now, let ∀ψG: η(〈A \G,ψG〉τ) ∈ x+ϕ . By the definition of x+ϕ this means that ϕ → η(〈A \
G,ψG〉τ) ∈ x for all ψG. Since ϕ → η(〈A \G,ψG〉τ is a necessity form and x is closed under R6, we
infer that ϕ → η([〈G〉]τ) ∈ x, and, consequently, η([〈G〉]τ) ∈ x+ϕ . So, x+ϕ is closed under R6.
Case Kax. Suppose that η(χ ∧ [ψG ∧ χ]τ) ∈ Kax for some given χ , for all ψG, and for some τ ∈
LCoRGAL. This means that Kaη(χ ∧ [ψG∧ χ]τ) ∈ x for all ψG. Since Kaη(χ ∧ [ψG∧ χ]τ) is a necessity
form, and x is closed under R5 (by Definition 2.17), we infer that Kaη([G,χ]τ) ∈ x, and, consequently,
η([G,χ]τ) ∈ Kax. So, Kax is closed under R5.
Now, let ∀ψG: η(〈A\G,ψG〉τ) ∈ Kax. By the definition of Kax this means that Kaη(〈A\G,ψG〉τ) ∈
x for all ψG. Since Kaη(〈A \G,ψG〉τ is a necessity form and x is closed under R6, we infer that
Kaη([〈G〉]τ) ∈ x, and, consequently, η([〈G〉]τ) ∈ Kax. So, Kax is closed under R6.
Case [ϕ]x. Finally, suppose that η(χ ∧ [ψG ∧ χ]τ) ∈ [ϕ]x for some given χ , for all ψG, and for
some τ ∈LCoRGAL. This means that [ϕ]η(χ ∧ [ψG∧ χ]τ) ∈ x for all ψG. Since [ϕ]η(χ ∧ [ψG∧ χ]τ) is
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a necessity form, and x is closed under R5 (by Definition 2.17), we infer that [ϕ]η([G,χ]τ) ∈ x, and,
consequently, η([G,χ]τ) ∈ [ϕ]x. So, [ϕ]x is closed under R5.
Now, let ∀ψG: η(〈A\G,ψG〉τ)∈ [ϕ]x. By the definition of [ϕ]x this means that [ϕ]η(〈A\G,ψG〉τ)∈
x for all ψG. Since [ϕ]η(〈A \G,ψG〉τ is a necessity form and x is closed under R6, we infer that
[ϕ]η([〈G〉]τ) ∈ x, and, consequently, η([〈G〉]τ) ∈ [ϕ]x. So, [ϕ]x is closed under R6.
Proposition B.6. Let ϕ ∈LCoRGAL. Then CoRGAL+ϕ is consistent iff ¬ϕ 6∈ CoRGAL.
Proof. From left to right. Suppose to the contrary that CoRGAL+ϕ is consistent and ¬ϕ ∈CoRGAL.
Then having both ϕ and ¬ϕ means that ⊥ ∈ CoRGAL+ϕ , which contradicts to CoRGAL+ϕ being
consistent.
From right to left. Let us consider the contrapositive: if CoRGAL+ϕ is inconsistent, then ¬ϕ ∈
CoRGAL. Since CoRGAL+ϕ is inconsistent, ⊥ ∈ CoRGAL+ϕ , or, by Proposition 2.18, ϕ →⊥ ∈
CoRGAL. By consistency of CoRGAL and propositional reasoning, we have that ¬ϕ ∈CoRGAL.
Proposition B.7. Let ψG, G⊆ A, and χ,ϕ,τ ∈ CoRGAL.
1. χ ∧ [ψG∧χ]ϕ <Size[,],[〈〉] [G,χ]ϕ ,
2. [τ](χ ∧ [ψG∧χ]ϕ)<Size[,],[〈〉] [τ][G,χ]ϕ ,
3. 〈A\G,ψG〉ϕ <Size[,],[〈〉] [〈G〉]ϕ ,
4. [τ]〈A\G,ψG〉ϕ <Size[,],[〈〉] [τ][〈G〉]ϕ .
Proof. 1. Note that [〈〉]-depth for both sides of the inequality is the same and equals d[〈〉](χ)+d[〈〉](ϕ).
In particular, d[〈〉](χ ∧ [ψG∧ χ]ϕ) = max{d[〈〉](χ), d[〈〉]([ψG∧ χ]ϕ)}= d[〈〉]([ψG∧ χ]ϕ) = d[〈〉](ψG∧
χ)+d[〈〉](ϕ) = d[〈〉](χ)+ d[〈〉](ϕ). Depth of the right-hand side formula is d[〈〉]([G,χ]ϕ) = d[〈〉](χ)+
d[〈〉](ϕ). However, [, ]-depth is different. Indeed, d[,]([ψG∧χ]ϕ) = d[,](ψG∧χ)+ d[,](ϕ) = d[,](χ)+
d[,](ϕ). For the right-hand side formula we have that d[,]([G,χ]ϕ) = d[,](χ)+ d[,](ϕ)+1. Hence,
χ ∧ [ψG∧χ]ϕ <Size[,],[〈〉] [G,χ]ϕ .
2. On the left-hand side we have d[〈〉]([τ](χ ∧ [ψG∧χ]ϕ)) = d[〈〉](τ)+d[〈〉](χ ∧ [ψG∧χ]ϕ) = d[〈〉](τ)+
d[〈〉](χ)+ d[〈〉](ϕ). We have the same [〈〉]-depth of the right-hand side: d[〈〉]([τ][G,χ]ϕ) = d[〈〉](τ)+
d[〈〉]([G,χ]ϕ) = d[〈〉](τ)+ d[〈〉](χ)+ d[〈〉](ϕ). However, [, ]-depth is different: d[,](τ)+d[,](χ)+d[,](ϕ)
and d[,](τ)+ d[,](χ)+ d[,](ϕ)+ 1 correspondingly (see the previous case). Hence, [τ](χ ∧ [ψG ∧
χ]ϕ)<Size[,],[〈〉] [τ][G,χ]ϕ .
3. On the left-hand side we have that d[〈〉](〈A \G,ψG〉ϕ) = d[〈〉](ϕ), and on the right-hand side the
depth is d[〈〉][〈G〉]ϕ = d[〈〉](ϕ)+1. Hence, 〈A\G,ψG〉ϕ <Size[,],[〈〉] [〈G〉]ϕ .
4. Again, according to the definition of [〈〉]-depth, d[〈〉]([τ]〈A\G,ψG〉ϕ)= d[〈〉](τ)+d[〈〉](〈A\G,ψG〉ϕ)=
d[〈〉](τ) + d[〈〉](ϕ), whereas d[〈〉]([τ][〈G〉]ϕ) = d[〈〉](τ) + d[〈〉]([〈G〉]ϕ) = d[〈〉](τ) + d[〈〉](ϕ) + 1. Thus,
[τ]〈A\G,ψG〉ϕ <Size[,],[〈〉] [τ][〈G〉]ϕ .
